Deep neural networks (DNNs) have proven to be quite e ective in a vast array of machine learning tasks, with recent examples in cyber security and autonomous vehicles. Despite the superior performance of DNNs in these applications, it has been recently shown that these models are susceptible to a particular type of a ack that exploits a fundamental aw in their design. is a ack consists of generating particular synthetic examples referred to as adversarial samples. ese samples are constructed by slightly manipulating real data-points in order to "fool" the original DNN model, forcing it to mis-classify previously correctly classi ed samples with high con dence. Addressing this aw in the model is essential if DNNs are to be used in critical applications such as those in cyber security.
INTRODUCTION
Beyond highly publicized victories in automatic game-playing as in Go [34] , there have been many successful applications of deep neural networks (DNN) in image and speech recognition. Recent explorations and applications include those in medical imaging [1, 38] and self-driving cars [11, 14] . In the domain of cybersecurity, security companies have demonstrated that deep learning could o er a far be er way to classify all types of malware [8, 30, 39] .
Despite its potential, deep neural networks (DNN), like all other machine learning approaches, are vulnerable to what is known as adversarial samples [2, 18] .
is means that they can be easily deceived by non-obvious and potentially dangerous manipulation [26, 35] . To be more speci c, an a acker could use the same training algorithm, back-propagation of errors, and a surrogate dataset to construct an auxiliary model. Since this model could provide the a acker with a capability of exploring a DNN's blind spots, he can, with minimal e ort, cra an adversarial sample -a synthetic example generated by slightly modifying a real example in order to make the deep learning system "believe" the sample subtly perturbed belongs to an incorrect class with high con dence.
According to a recent study [12] , adversarial samples occur in a subspace relatively broad, which means it is impractical to build a defense that can rule out all adversarial samples. As such, the design principle followed by existing defense mechanisms is not to harden a DNN model naturally resistant to any adversarial samples. Rather, they focus on hiding that subspace, making adversaries di cult in nding impactful adversarial samples. For example, representative defenses -adversarial training [12] and defensive distillation [29] both increase the complexity of original DNNs with the goal of making adversarial samples -impactful for original DNNs -no longer e ective.
However, in this work, we show that the defenses proposed are far from ideal and even considered a dangerous practice. In particular, we demonstrate existing defense mechanisms all follow the approach of "security through obscurity", in which security is achieved by keeping defenses obscured from adversaries. Frankly speaking, defenses following this approach indeed mitigate the adversarial sample problem. However, when applied to security critical applications such as malware classi cation, they become particularly disconcerting.
In the past, there have been a huge amount of debates on security through obscurity, and a general consensus has been reach. at is, obscurity is a perfectly valid security tactic but it cannot be trusted for security. Once design or implementation is uncovered, users totally lost all the security gained by obscurity. To regain the security through obscurity, one has to come up with a completely new design or implementation. As such, Kerckho s' principle [19] suggests obscurity can be used as a layer of defense, but it should never be used as the only layer of defense.
Inspired by this, we propose a new mechanism to escalate a DNN's resistance to adversarial samples. Di erent from existing defenses, our proposed approach unnecessitates model obscurity. In other words, even though we reveal the model, it will still be more than burdensome for adversaries to cra adversarial samples.
More speci cally, we arm a standard DNN with a data transformation module, which projects original data input into a new representation before they are passed through the consecutive DNN.
is can be used as a defense for the following two reasons. First, data transformation can potentially stash away the space of adversarial manipulations to a carefully designed hyperspace. is makes a ackers di cult in nding adversarial samples impactful for the armed DNN. Second, as we will theoretically prove in Section 4, a data transformation module carefully designed can exponentially increase computation complexity for an a acker to cra impactful adversarial samples. is means that, even though an a acker compromises obscurity and has the full knowledge about the armed DNN model (i.e., the training algorithm, dataset and hyper-parameters), he still cannot launch the a ack -detrimental to DNNs enhanced by other adversary-resistant techniques -nor jeopardize model resistance.
e approach proposed in this work is bene cial for the following reasons. First, it escalates a DNN's resistance to adversarial samples with be er security assurance. Second, our approach ensures that a DNN maintains desirable classi cation performance while requiring only minimal modi cation to existing architectures.
ird, while this work is primarily motivated by the need to safeguard DNN models used in critical security applications, it should be noted that the proposed technique is general and can be adopted to other applications where deep learning is popularly applied, such as image recognition and sentiment analysis. We demonstrate this applicability using publicly-available datasets in Section 5.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions.
• We propose a generic approach to facilitate the development of adversary-resistant DNNs without following the tactic of security through obscurity.
• Using our approach, we develop an adversary-resistant DNN, and theoretically prove its resistance cannot be jeopardized even if the model is fully disclosed.
• We evaluate the classi cation performance and robustness of our adversary-resistant DNN and compare it with that ... ...
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Figure 1: A feed-forward deep neural network with three hidden layers and a so max output layer.
of existing defense mechanisms. Our result shows that our DNN exhibits similar -sometimes even be er -classi cation performance but with superior model resistance. e rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of DNNs and adversarial sample problem. Section 3 discusses existing defense mechanisms and de nes the problem scope of our research. Section 4 presents our generic approach. In Section 5, we develop and evaluate DNNs in the context of image recognition, sentiment analysis and malware classi cation. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 6.
BACKGROUND
A typical DNN architecture consists of multiple successive layers of processing elements, or so-called "neurons". Each processing layer can be viewed as learning a di erent, more abstract representation of the original multidimensional input distribution. As a whole, a DNN can be viewed as a highly complex function, f (·) that is capable of nonlinearly mapping an original high-dimensional data point to a lower dimensional output. In this section, we brie y introduce the well-established DNN model, followed by the description of the adversarial learning problem.
Deep Neural Networks
As is graphically depicted in Figure 1 , a DNN contains an input layer, multiple hidden layers, and an output layer. e input layer takes in each data sample in the form of a multidimensional vector. Starting from the input, computing the pre-activations of each subsequent layer simply requires, at minimum, a matrix multiplication (where a weight/parameter vector, with length equal to the number of hidden units in the target layer, is assigned to each unit of the layer below) usually followed by summation with a bias vector. is process roughly models the process of a layer of neurons integrating the information received from the layer below (i.e., computing a pre-activation) before applying an elementwise activation function 1 . is integrate-then-re process is repeated subsequently for each layer until the last layer is reached. e last layer, or output, is generally interpreted as the model's predictions for some given input data, and is o en designed to compute a parameterized likelihood distribution using the so max function (also known as multi-class regression or minimizing cross entropy). is bo omup propagation of information is also referred to as feed-forward inference [15] .
During the learning phase of the model, the DNN's predictions are evaluated by comparing them with known target labels associated with the training samples (also known as the"ground truth"). Speci cally, both predictions and labels are taken as the input to L(·), a selected cost function. e DNN's parameters are then optimized with respect to this cost function using the method of steepest gradient descent, minimizing prediction errors on the training set.
More formally, given (X , Y ): {(x 1 , 1 ), . . . , (x n , n )}, where x i ∈ R m is a data sample and i ∈ R k is the corresponding data label, where, if categorical, is typically represented through a 1-of-k encoding, the goal of model learning is to minimize the cost function represented by
, where f (w; x i ) denotes the prediction of training sample x i and w represents the weights and bias associated with the connections between neurons.
Adversarial Sample Problem
An adversarial sample is a synthetic data sample cra ed by introducing slight perturbations to a legitimate input sample (see Figure 2) . In multi-class classi cation tasks, such adversarial samples can cause a DNN to classify themselves into a random class other than the correct one (sometimes not even a reasonable alternative). Recent research [6] demonstrates that, a ackers can uncover such data samples through various approaches (e.g., [3, 12, 21, 28, 32, 35] ) which can all be described as solving either optimization problem
or optimization problem
Here, optimization problem (1) indicates that an a acker searches for adversarial samplex, the prediction of which is as far as its true label, whereas optimization problem (2) indicates an a acker searches for adversarial samplex so that its prediction is as close as target labelˆ whereˆ is not equal to , the true label of that adversarial sample.
In both optimization problems above, L(·) represents the aforementioned cost function and f (·) denotes the DNN model trained with the traditional learning method discussed above . · p is pnorm -sometimes also speci ed as l p distance -indicating the dissimilarity between adversarial samplex and its corresponding legit data sample x. With di erent values of p -most popularly selected in adversarial learning research -the optimization problems above can be computed in the following manners. Adversarial samples generated by following [12] Adversarial samples generated by following [6] Adversarial samples generated by following [35] Figure 2: Legitimate samples and their corresponding adversarial samples generated by following various approaches.
e adversarial samples are cra ed by introducing to the legitimate samples pertubations nearly indistinguishable to the human eyes.
(1) With p = 2, p-norm represents the measure of Euclidean distance.
e constraint optimization problems above can be speci ed as unconstrained optimization problemŝ
Here, both (3) and (4) can be solved by following either a rstorder optimization method (e.g., stochastic gradient descent [6] and L-BFGS [35] ) or a second-order method (e.g., Newton-Raphson method). (2) With p = 0, p-norm indicates the number of elements in a legit data sample that an a acker needs to manipulate in order to turn it into an adversarial sample. Di erent from the computation method above, in the se ing of p = 0 where unconstrained optimization problems (3) and (4) are not di erentiable, the computation for the optimal solution has to follow an approximation method introduced in [28] or [6] .
(3) With p = ∞, p-norm becomes a measure indicating the maximum change to individual features. As such, the optimal solution for (1) and (2) can be approximated by following the fast gradient sign method [12] , which computes perturbation ∂L(f (x; w); )/∂x (or ∂L(f (x; w);ˆ )/∂x), multiplies it by distortion scale ε and then adds the product to legitimate data sample x. Note that the way they compute that perturbation can be through back-propagation in conjunction with gradient descent.
As is illustrated in the aforementioned optimization problems, in order to generate impactful adversarial samples, an a acker needs to know either standard DNN model f (·) or know of a way to approximate f (·). A recent study [35] has revealed that an a acker could well approximate a standard DNN model using a traditional DNN training algorithm on an auxiliary training dataset. In this paper, we use "cross-model approach" to refer to those adversarial sample cra ing methods that rely upon the approximation of a standard DNN model.
EXISTING DEFENSES AND PROBLEM SCOPE
To counteract the adversarial learning problem described in the section above, recent research invent various training algorithms [12, 13, 27, 35] to improve the robustness of a DNN model. ey indicate, by using new training algorithms they design, one can improve a DNN's resistance to the adversarial samples cra ed through the aforementioned cross-model approach. is is due to the fact that their training algorithms smooth a standard DNN's decision boundary, making adversarial samples -impactful to standard DNN models -no longer su ciently e ective. In this section, we summarize these defense mechanisms and discuss their limitations. Following our summary and discussion, we also de ne the problem scope of our research.
Existing Defense Mechanisms
Recently, research in hardening deep learning mainly focuses on two di erent tactics -data augmentation and model complexity enhancement. Here, we summarize them in turn and disucss their limitations. Data augmentation. To resolve the issue of "blind spots" (a more informal name given to adversarial samples), many methods that could be considered as sophisticated forms of data augmentation 2 have been proposed (e.g. [12, 13, 27] ). In principle, these methods expand their training set by combining known samples with potential blind spots, the process of which has been called adversarial training [12] . Technically speaking, adversarial training can be formally described as adding a regularization term known as DataGrad to a DNN's training loss function [27] . e regularization penalizes the directions uncovered by adversarial perturbations (introduced in Section 2.2). erefore, adversarial training can work to improve the robustness of a standard DNN. Model complexity enhancement. DNN models are already complex, with respect to both the nonlinear function that they try to approximate as well as their layered composition of many parameters. However, the underlying architecture is straightforward when it comes to facilitating the ow of information forwards and backwards, greatly alleviating the e ort in generating adversarial samples. erefore, several ideas [13, 29] have been proposed to enhance the complexity of DNN models, aiming to improve the tolerance of complex DNN models with respect to adversarial samples generated from simple DNN models. For example, [29] developed a defensive distillation mechanism, which trains a DNN from data samples that are "distilled" from another DNN. By using the knowledge transferred from the other DNN, the learned DNN classi ers become less sensitive to adversarial samples. Similarly, [13] proposed to stack an auto-encoder together with a standard DNN. It shows that this auto-encoding enhancement increases a DNN's resistance to adversarial samples. Limitation. While the aforementioned defenses have yielded promising results in terms of increasing model resistance, the scope of the model resistance they provide is relatively limited. Once an a acker obtains the knowledge of the new training algorithms -instead of using a traditional DNN training algorithm to substitute the algorithm which the target DNN is trained with -he can build his own model with the new training algorithm, and then use it as the cross model to facilitate the cra ing of adversarial samples. As we will show in Section 5, the adversarial samples cra ed through such new cross models sustain their o ensiveness to the corresponding DNN models. is indicates that the e ectiveness of existing defense mechanisms is highly dependent upon the obscurity of training algorithms.
Problem Scope
With the existing defenses and their limitation in mind, here we de ne the problem scope of our research. Similar to most previous research -if not all -in hardening deep learning, we assume that an a acker cra s adversarial samples by solving the aforementioned optimization problems with derivative calculation (e.g., fast sign gradient descent or Newton-Raphson method). We believe this assumption is realistic for the following reason.
Derivative calculation is the most general approach for solving an optimization problem. In the future, while one might be able to derive new forms of approaches in solving the aforementioned optimization problem, he or she has to ensure the new approaches are computationally e cient. Without the aid from derivative calculation, this can be relatively di cult. Even if one could computationally e ciently resolve the aforementioned optimization problems -for example perhaps through relaxation -without derivative calculation, he still need to prove the adversarial samples derived from such an approach are impactful. Given that relaxation reshapes an optimization problem, the "optimal" solution may not even close to any local optima of that original optimization problem.
Di erent from prior research, we also assume that an adversary has not only the access to a DNN's structure as well as the dataset(s) used to build the DNN but more importantly the algorithm used to train the network. In other words, we assume a target DNN model is no longer obscure to an adversary and rather he has the full knowledge about a DNN model that he a empts to exploit. We believe this assumption is more practical because there is li le hope of keeping an adversary-resistant training algorithm completely secret from dedicated a ackers. In the long run, any system the security of which relies upon the obscurity of its design can be doomed [19] .
OUR APPROACH
To address the problem above, we propose a new approach to harden DNN models. Technically speaking, it follows the tactic of model complexity enhancement, which improves model resistance by increasing model complexity. Di erent from the existing techniques mentioned above, our approach however goes beyond the scope of robustness they provide. It ensures that an a acker cannot perform the aforementioned a ack to generate adversarial samples impactful to our learning model even if we reveal our training algorithm. In other words, our approach escalate a DNN's resistance to adversarial samples without the requirement of obscuring training algorithms.
As is discussed in the section above, the adversarial learning problem can be viewed as an optimization problem. To resolve that optimization problem, one needs to conduct analytical computation of gradients with respect to an input data sample and perform backward propagation accordingly. erefore, we escalate a DNN's robustness not only by increasing the model complexity but, more importantly, restricting back-propagation.
More speci cally, we integrate to a DNN a data transformation module, (·) graphically indicated in Figure 3 . As is illustrated in the gure, the data transformation module projects X , an input data sample to (X ), a new representation, before passing it through a consecutive DNN. is transformation increases the complexity of a DNN model and augments its resistance to adversarial samples cra ed through the aforementioned cross-model scheme. In addition, it blocks the backward ows of gradients. With this block, even if the underlying training algorithm is disclosed, an adversary cannot cra adversarial samples. In the following, we specify the design principle of our data transformation module, followed by its design detail and some necessary discussions.
Design Principle
To block the backward ow of gradients, the design of data transformation must satisfy three requirements. Most notably, the data transformation must be non-di erentiable. As is discussed above, cra ing adversarial samples requires the calculation of gradients as well as the back-propagation of those gradients. By making data transformation module (·) non-di erentiable, therefore, we can make gradient calculation intractable and thus obstruct the backward ow of gradients. More formally, we can choose nondi erentiable function (x), making the derivative di cult to be calculated, i.e.,
Here, f (·) represents the DNN model in tandem with the data transformation module, and L(·) denotes the cost function described in Section 2.2. e derivative can be computed using either a rstorder optimization method (e.g., gradient descent) or a second-order method (e.g., Newton-Raphson method), in which n is equal to 1 and 2, respectively. While the non-di erentiability feature restricts the cra ing of adversarial samples, an adversary might still be able to generate adversarial samples. Since end-to-end gradient ow is blocked at the input layer of the successive DNN, back-propagation can only carry error gradients to the output of the transformation module. Given (·), an adversary could construct an adversarial sample by inverting transformation module (·) and passing the manipulated transformation output through the inversion of the transformation. More formally, the adversary can construct an adversarial sample by computing
In addition to making data transformation non-di erentiable, therefore, we must further ensure that the inversion of the data transformation is computationally intractable. In other words, the data transformation (·) needs to have the property of non-invertibility.
Satisfying the two requirements above ensures that our proposed approach can prohibit an a acker from cra ing adversarial samples directly from the target DNN model, and one does not need to concern about the disclosure of training algorithms. However, the data transformation proposed may signi cantly jeopardize the accuracy of a DNN model if not designed carefully. Take the following extreme case for example.
Hash functions like MD5 and SHA1 are one-way functions which have the properties of non-di erentiability as well as non-invertibility. By simply using it as the transformation module, we can easily prohibit an a acker from cra ing adversarial samples even if he knows of which hash function we choose and how we integrate it with DNNs. However, a hash function signi cantly changes the distribution of input data samples. Armed with it, a DNN model su ers from signi cant loss in classi cation performance. Last but not least, our design therefore must ensure data transformation can preserve the distribution of data representation. is can potentially make a DNN robust without sacri cing classi cation performance.
Design Detail
Following the design principle above, we choose Locally Linear Embedding (LLE) [31] , a non-parametric dimensionality reduction mechanism, serving as the data transformation module. As we will discuss in the following, this representative non-parametric method is non-di erentiable. More importantly, it can be theoretically proven that inverting LLE is an NP-hard problem. Last but not least, LLE seeks low-dimensional, neighborhood-preserving map of high-dimensional input samples, and thus is a method that best suited to preserving as much information in the input as possible. In the following, we rst describe LLE and then expound upon the fact that, as a non-parametric dimensionality reduction method, LLE is non-di erentiable. Furthermore, we theoretically prove LLE is computationally non-invertible.
Locally Linear
Embedding. LLE is a non-parametric method designed to reduce input data dimensionality and at the same time preserve local properties of high-dimensional input in a lowerdimensional space. To some extent, this can ensure the distribution of high-dimensional data samples is as close as they are in a lower-dimensional space. Technically speaking, this is achieved by representing each high-dimensional data sample via a linear combination of its nearest neighbors. More formally, this can be expressed as
Here, x i and x j (x i , x j ∈ R 1×m ) denote the i t h data sample and its j t h neighbor (j = 1, 2..., N ), respectively. w i j represents the weight, indicating the contribution of x j to data sample x i . As is described in [31] , those weights (a.k.a. reconstruction weights) can be represented as weight matrix W and computed by solving the following optimization problem:
s.t.
In weight matrix W , LLE deems w i j = 0 if x j is not considered as a neighbor of x i , and the total number of neighbors assigned to x i is a carefully selected hyper-parameter. e neighboring relation between x i and x j depends on the value of the l 2 distance between x i and x j . Since the reconstruction weights encode the local properties of the high-dimensional data, they can be used to preserve the data distribution at the time of performing dimensionality reduction. More speci cally, LLE imposes the corresponding reconstruction weights to each lower-dimensional data sample via a similar linear combination, and then a empts to nd Y = { 1 , 2 , . . . , N }, the lower-dimensional representation of X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N } by solving the following optimization problem:
where i , j ∈ R 1×m c , indicating i , j consist of m c of elements. In order to solve the optimization problem above, the RayleitzRitz theorem [16] is typically used. It computes the eigenvectors corresponding to the smallest nonzero eigenvalues of the inner matrix product (I − W ) T · (I − W ). For a detailed explication, we refer the readers to [16] . Here, I ∈ R N ×N is an identity matrix, and W ∈ R N ×N is the aforementioned reconstruction weight matrix.
LLE is speci cally designed to retain the similarity between pairs of high dimensional samples when they are mapped to lower dimensions [31] . To illustrate this property, we provide a visualization of the data before and a er being processed by LLE in Figure 4 . e visualization result demonstrates that using LLE as a data transformation module satis es the last design principle discussed in Section 4.1 (i.e., preserving the distribution of the original data). More importantly, this property also helps bound the lower dimensional mapping of adversarial samples to a vicinity which is lled by mappings of original test samples that are highly similar to these adversarial samples. As a result, there is a signi cantly lower chance that an adversarial sample acts as an outliers in the lower dimensional space. In other words, LLE makes a DNN more resistant to adversarial samples. In Section 5, we empirically validate this important property.
Non-di erentiability of LLE.
Existing dimensionality reduction methods can be categorized as either parametric or nonparametric [36] . Parametric methods utilize a xed amount of parameters to specify a direct mapping from high-dimensional data samples to their low-dimensional projections (or vice versa). is direct mapping is characterized by parameters, which are typically optimized to provide the best mapping performance. is is similar to the functionality provided by a standard DNN, which maps high-dimensional data samples to the nal decision space through di erentiable function f (·). As such, the derivative of parametric methods typically can be computed in an analytically e cient manner. In other words, parametric methods are generally di erentiable, and this nature becomes a disadvantage for blocking the backward gradient ow.
On the contrary, non-parametric methods do not su er from the issue above. For any non-parametric method, (·), there is no way to express it in a closed form. erefore, the derivative of (·) can be computed only through a numeric but not an analytical approach. More formally, this means the calculation of ∂ (x)/∂x needs to be completed through the calculation of limit lim h→0
. Given that a deep neural network takes as input each individual sample, which is discrete in the sample space, it is di cult to de ne the continuity of (·) with traditional topology and thus the di erentiability of (·) cannot be guaranteed. is indicates, as a member of non-parametric methods, LLE perfectly satis es the rst design principle discussed in Section 4.1 (i.e., not capable of performing derivative calculation).
Non-invertibility of LLE.
We validate the non-invertibility of LLE by theoretically proving that reconstructing original highdimensional data from low-dimensional representations transformed by LLE is computationally intractable. More formally, we prove that, given a set of low-dimensional data Y = { 1 , 2 , . . . , N } (Y ∈ R N ×m c ) produced by LLE, reconstructing their original highdimensional representations X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N } (X ∈ R N ×m ) from Y is at least an NP-hard problem.
Recall that LLE computes weight matrix W and utilizes it to project high-dimensional data samples to a lower-dimensional space. As a result, to restore high-dimensional data from its lowerdimensional representations, one has to recover that matrix by following the calculation similar to that shown in (7), except that x i and x j are replaced by i and j .
Once weight matrix W is restored, the recovery of original highdimensional data can be viewed as solving the following optimization problem:
It is not di cult to realize that Equation (9) can be de ned in the following quadratic form:
where m i j = δ i j − w i j − w ji + k w ki w k j . Note that δ i j = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. If expressing m i j as the following matrix:
we can easily realize that M is a symmetric matrix, which has the property of M T = M. Now, with the analysis above, the validation of non-invertibility amounts to proving that solving (10) is at least an NP-hard problem. In this work, we conduct this proof by introducing several constraints to this equation. Our basic idea is to use these constraints to relax the optimization problem in (10) to a nearby problem which can be easily proved as an NP-hard problem. More speci cally, we introduce the following constraints:
and
where ì 0 denotes a zero vector, and x i j represents the j th element in vector x i .
With these constraints introduced to Equation 10, we can relax the optimization problem to a quadratic problem with a nonpositive semi-de nite constraint, which itself is a class of NP-hard problems [9] . In the following, we provide more details on why the involvement of the aforementioned constraints transforms the optimization problem in (10) to this class of NP-hard problems.
Let A ∈ R N A ×1 denote a column vector which is the concatenation of x i for i = 1, . . . , N and N A = N × m.
en, we have A = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x N ) T . Let q ∈ R 1×N A denote a row vector in which every element is equal to 1. We further de ne matrices P, Q ∈ R N A ×N A as follows:
where P i j = m i j · . ∈ R m×m is a matrix of ones where every element is equal to 1. Given the constraint in (12) that we introduce, it is not di cult to discover i x T i = ì 0. Since the multiplication of a vector and its transpose derives a non-negative value, we have Σ i x i x T i ≥ 0 and the constraint in (12) can be expressed as inequation −Σ i x i x T i + i x T i + α ≤ 0, indicating there exists a positive number, α that always holds the inequity. By rewriting the inequation using the notations newly de ned above, we can therefore transform the constraint in (12) into the form of A T QA + qA + α ≤ 0.
Given the constraint in (13), we can easily derive inequation Σ i x i x T i − N A ≤ 0, which can be further expressed as Σ i x i x T i − N A + γ ≤ 0 indicating there alway exists a constant, γ that holds the inequity. By rewriting both the constraint itself and this inequation using newly de ned notations, we can derive constraints A ∞ ≤ 1 as well as A T IA − N A + γ ≤ 0. As such, we can transform Equation (10) and the aforementioned constraints in (12) and (13) into following form:
Here, Q is negative semi-de nite, and thus Equation (15) is a quadratic problem with a non-positive semi-de nite constraint. According to [9, 37] , Equation (15) belongs to a class of NP-hard problems, which implies the non-invertability of LLE.
Discussion
Here, we discuss some related issues and possible a acks against our proposed technique. Approximation of LLE. While the aforementioned discussion and theoretical proof have already indicated the e ectiveness of our proposed approach, intuition suggests that an adversary might still come up with an a ack. Speci cally, he might approximate LLE using a parametric mapping and then substitute LLE accordingly. Since parametric mappings do not have the property of non-di erentiability, the adversary can take advantage of the substitute, pass gradients through and eventually cra adversarial samples. However, as we will show in Section 5, even using the state-of-the-art approximation scheme, an adversary cannot cra impactful adversarial samples. Other dimensionality reduction methods. As is described above, we choose LLE, a representative non-parametric dimensionality reduction method, to serve as the data transformation module. is is due to the fact that it provides many properties needed for hardening a DNN, such as non-di erentiability, non-invertibility and the capability of preserving data distribution.
Going beyond LLE, there are other non-parametric dimensionality reduction methods that o er the same properties, e.g., tDistributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [23] and Sammon Mapping [33] . However, they cannot be utilized in our problem domain for the following reason.
Deep neural networks exhibit superior performance when dealing with data in a relatively high dimensionality. Other non-parametric methods are typically designed more for tasks like visualization [23] where it is required that the dimensionality of the mappings is two or three. Using them as our data transformation module, they cannot provide high-dimensional data input for the DNN in tandem with the transformation, and may signi cantly jeopardize classication performance.
EVALUATION
As is described in Section 1, adversarial training [12] and defensive distillation [29] are the most representative techniques that have been proposed to defend against adversarial samples. In this work, we use the proposed approach to train our own adversary resistant DNN (LLE-DNN), and then compare it with those enhanced by these two approaches.
Dataset
We evaluate our adversary-resistant DNN model by performing multiple experiments on several widely used datasets, including a dataset for malware detection [5] , the MNIST dataset for image recognition [20] and the IMDB dataset for sentiment analysis [22] . Malware dataset: It is a collection of window audit logs, each of which ties to either a benign or malicious so ware sample. e dimensionality of the feature-space for each sample is reduced to 10,000 based on the feature selection metric in [5] . Each feature indicates the occurrence of either a single lesystem access or a sequence of access events, thus taking on the value of 0 or 1. Figure 2 illustrates a subset of features of a so ware sample. Here, 0 indicates that the sequence of events did not occur while 1 indicates the opposite. For each so ware sample, it has been labeled with either 1 or 0, indicating malicious and benign so ware, respectively. e dataset is split into 26,078 training examples, with 14,399 benign and 11,679 malicious so ware samples, and 6,000 testing samples, with benign and malicious so ware samples evenly divided. MNIST dataset: It is a large database of handwri en digits that is commonly used for training various image processing systems. It is composed of 70,000 greyscale images (of 28×28, or 784, pixels) of handwri en digits, split into a training set of 60,000 samples and a testing set of 10,000 samples. IMDB dataset: It consists of 25,000 movie reviews, with one half labeled as "positive" and the other "negative", indicating the sentiment of these reviews. We randomly split the dataset with 70% movie reviews for training and the remaining for testing. Following the procedure introduced in [24] , we encoded the words in each movie review using a dictionary carrying 5,000 words most frequently used. en, we utilized a word embedding technique [24] to convert each word into a vector with a dimensionality of 600. For each movie review, we linearly combined the vectors indicating the words appearing in that review, and then treat the embedding as the representation of that movie review. Table 2 : An illustration of features in malware dataset. Individual features are represented in rows. ey are either a lesystem access or a sequence of lesystem events.
Learning Technology
Black Box White Box MNIST MALWARE IMDB MNIST MALWARE IMDB l ∞ l 2 l 0 l 0 l ∞ l 2 l ∞ l 2 l 0 l 0 l ∞ l 2 Standard
Experimental Design
For each application described above, we train 4 DNN models using the traditional deep learning training method, adversarial training [12] , defensive distillation [29] and our own approach. We specify the hyperparameters of these DNNs in Table 3 . We measure their classi cation accuracy by applying the models to the corresponding testing datasets. By comparing their classi cation performance, we evaluate the in uence that our proposed approach brings to a DNN. More speci cally, we examine if LLE-DNN exhibits similar -if not the same or be er -classi cation accuracy.
Since the goal of this work is to improve the robustness of a DNN model, we also evaluate our DNN models' resistance to adversarial samples. In particular, we derive adversarial samples from the aforementioned testing datasets, test them against our DNN model and compare its model resistance with those of DNNs enhanced by the other two techniques [12, 29] .
As is discussed in Section 2.2, an a acker cra s adversarial samples through auxiliary models. In Table 1 , black-box and white-box indicate the auxiliary models trained through di erent schemes. More speci cally, black-box represents the auxiliary model trained through the standard deep learning training scheme, indicating an a acker does not have su cient knowledge about the underlying training algorithm and he can use only a standard approach to train a cross model and cra adversarial samples. White-box represents the auxiliary model trained exactly through the learning schemes proposed as a defense. is simulates a situation where a defense mechanism is publicly disclosed and an a acker exploits that mechanism to produce a highly similar -if not the same -model to cra adversarial samples. Note that, for both black-box and white-box tactics, we use the same hyperparameters and training dataset to build auxiliary models. More speci cally, our auxiliary model training shares the same hyperparameters and training dataset with the standard DNN shown in Table 3 .
In addition to the methods described in Section 2.2, the cra ing of adversarial samples must ensure a slight perturbation introduced to a data sample does not undermine its semantic. In other words, we must make sure that, while misleading a classi er to output the wrong class with high con dence, the perturbation to an image should be nearly indistinguishable to the human eyes, that to a malicious so ware sample should not jeopardize so ware functionality nor break its malevolence, and that to a movie review should not break its semantic meaning. In the following, we describe how we ne-tune adversarial samples to preserve semantic for di erent applications. Malware classi cation. Recall that our malware samples are represented by features, the value of which are binary, indicating the occurrence of an lesystem access or a sequence of access events. Table 3 : e hyperparameters of all the investigated DNN models.
lesystem access events in that this might jeopardize the functionality of the so ware sample and even break down its malevolence. With this in mind, a bit of care must be taken.
In this work, our experiment follows the approach introduced in Section 2.2. To be speci c, we cra adversarial so ware samples by solving optimization problem (1) with the se ing of zero norm (i.e., l 0 ). is indicates the manipulation to a sample is restricted to ipping binary feature values. In addition, this implies the strongest a ack scenario in that optimization problem (1) carries less constraints making the adversarial samples chosen for our evaluation more impactful. Going beyond adversarial sample craing approach discussed in Section 2.2, we also restrict that the value change of a feature can be only from 0 to 1 but not the opposite.
is amounts to allowing the addition of new lesystem access events only. is manipulation strategy is reasonable for the reason that malware mutation techniques (e.g., [25] ) can morph a malware sample by stitching together instructions from benign programs, making the malware perform additional lesystem accesses but not undermining its maliciousness nor its functionality. Since malware manipulation is done with the intent of fooling a malware classi er driven by a DNN, it should be noticed that we do not morph a benign so ware sample, making it malicious. Image recognition. Image data samples contain less strict semantic than the malware data samples above. To preserve image semantic -making a perturbation nearly indistinguishable -we follow the approaches introduced in [6, 12, 35] . More speci cally, we selected l 0 , l 2 and l ∞ distance to represent the dissimilarity between an image and its corresponding adversarial sample. Especially, we restrict the l ∞ distance in a relative small range (i.e., ϵ ≤ 0.15) when cra ing adversarial samples. Sentiment Analysis. To generate adversarial samples for movie reviews, we again followed the approach introduced in Section 2.2. To be speci c, we solved optimization problem (1) and con gured p-norm with the se ing to l 2 and l ∞ . is is due to the fact that each review is encoded in a vector in which each element is a decimal, and l 2 and l ∞ distances represent the best measure for the dissimilarity between a movie review and its corresponding adversarial sample. Table 4 : e comparison of classi cation accuracy on di erent datasets.
As is mentioned above, each vocabulary has been encoded in a vector with a dimensionality of 600, and we embedded a movie review by linearly combining corresponding vectors. When generating an adversarial sample by introducing a slight perturbation to the embedding, we cast the perturbation to only one vector. is ensures that we introduce only one word change to that review with the hope that it preserves the semantic meaning of that review as much as possible. However, one word change does not guarantee the invariance of the semantic meaning. For example, it would be obvious alteration to the semantic meaning if the replacement happens to be the negative word in "… makes it the biggest disappointment I've experienced from cinema in years …". As such, we manually choose the word that incurs minimal semantic change to that movie review. Figure 5 illustrates a movie review sample and its corresponding adversarial sample generated through this approach.
Experimental Setup and Results
On the datasets described above, we rst measure the accuracy of all the aforementioned defense techniques. We then measure their resistance to the adversarial samples cra ed through the aforementioned tactics.
Classification Accuracy.
To identify the optimal dimensionality to which LLE needs to map original data samples, we implemented several LLE-DNNs with di erent se ings of dimensionality of LLE mappings. Figure 6 shows the impact of dimensionality mapping upon the classi cation accuracy obtained by LLE-DNN. Across all three datasets, it is easy to observe that, the classi cation accuracy rst increases when the dimensionality of the LLE mappings rises and then starts to decrease. In our experiment, we choose the highest classi cation accuracy to represent the performance of our LLE-DNN. Table 4 presents the classi cation accuracy results obtained from all investigated DNNs with respect to the testing datasets. Note that, while prior works (e.g, [7, 10] ) have already demonstrated they can train a DNN with an error rate less than 1% on the MNIST benchmark, their performance improvement does not result from a DNN but model ensemble or elastic distortions added to training data. To study the in uence of our proposed approach upon a standard DNN, therefore, we did not combine models nor augment with arti cially distorted versions of the original training samples. e classi cation accuracy shown in the table has already represented the best performance that a standard DNN can achieve.
Similar to adversarial training and defensive distillation, the LLE-DNN is quite e ective in preserving classi cation accuracy.
is implies our proposed approach well preserves data sample distribution. For the malware classi cation task, it can be observed that LLE-DNN appears to be be er at feature learning, achieving the highest classi cation accuracy among DNNs that we investigated.
is is presumably due to the fact that malware data samples are highly sparse carrying a large amount of redundant information, and the data transformation module in LLE-DNN eliminates those redundancy and ameliorates the learning ability of a DNN. Table 1 illustrates the DNNs that we investigated as well as their accuracy in classifying adversarial samples. It can be observed that, black-box adversarial samples can cut down the accuracy of the standard DNN to 6.86%, 6.40% and 7.50% under the a acks of l ∞ , l 2 and l 0 , respectively. In contrast, all of the defense mechanisms investigated demonstrate strong resistance to these black-box adversarial samples.
Model Resistance.
is indicates, without su cient knowledge on the underlying defense mechanisms, it is di cult for an a acker to cra impactful adversarial samples. In other words, existing defense mechanisms can signi cantly escalate a DNN's resistance to adversarial samples if one can obscure the design of the defenses.
Despite the improvement in model robustness, we also observe that our LLE-DNN generally exhibits the best resistance to blackbox adversarial samples, whereas the defensive distillation approach typically yields the worst resistance. is is presumably due to the fact that, the dimensionality reduction resided in LLE-DNN transforms adversarial samples into a subspace in which they no longer act as outliers, while defensive distillation smooths only a classi cation decision boundary which does not signi cantly reduce the subspace of adversarial samples.
With regard to the white-box se ing, we discover both adversarial training and defensive distillation su er from white-box adversarial samples. eir resistance to white-box adversarial samples is signi cantly worse than those created under the black-box se ing.
is observation is consistent with that reported in [6] . e reason behind this is that, both techniques stash away the adversarial sample subspace, but the disclosure of defense mechanisms uncovers the path of nding that subspace.
Di erent from adversarial training and defensive distillation, our LLE-DNN is naturally resistant to white-box adversarial samples. As is discussed in Section 4, our proposed approach stashes away the adversarial sample subspace and at the same time restricts derivative calculation. Even if our defense mechanism is revealed, therefore, it is still computationally di cult to nd adversarial samples.
To perform quantitative comparison with the other two approaches, however, we approximate the data transformation in the LLE-DNN -non-parametric dimensionality reduction component -using a parametric model. To be speci c, we choose a DNN to approximate LLE in that a DNN has a large amount of parameters which is typically viewed as the best approximation for non-parametric learning models [17] . With the support from this approximation, we treated the LLE-DNN as a white box and generated adversarial samples accordingly. We show its model resistance in Table 1 . It can be observed that, our LLE-DNN still demonstrates strong resistance to white-box adversarial samples even if we substituted LLE to its best approximation. is implies that, there might a theoretical lower bound between a non-parametric model and its parametric approximation, which can naturally serve as a defense against white-box adversarial samples.
CONCLUSION
A Deep Neural Network is vulnerable to adversarial samples. Existing defense mechanisms improve a DNN model's resistance to adversarial samples by using the tactic of security through obscurity. Once the design of the defense is disclosed, therefore, the robustness they provide wane. Motivated by this, this work introduces a new approach to escalate the robustness of a DNN model. In particular, it integrates to a DNN model LLE, a non-parametric dimensionality reduction method. With this approach, we show that one can develop a DNN model resistant to adversarial samples even if he or she reveals its design details (i.e., the underlying training algorithm). By demonstrating the DNNs enhanced by our proposed technique across various applications, we argue the proposed approach introduces nearly no degradation in classi cation performance. In contrast, for some applications, it even exhibits performance improvement. As part of the future work, we will further explore the performance of this approach in a wider variety of applications across di erent deep neural architectures.
